> CRACK TRACKER
Real-time feed of stress events across PE/PC. Filterable by category. Source-linked.
PE-BACKED DEFAULTS TIMELINE
PE-BACKED DEFAULTS TIMELINE
$3.1B LBO loaded with $2.5B debt. Bankrupt 2018 ($2.1B long-term debt). New PE owners (Elliott/Monarch). Bankrupt AGAIN August 2025 ($1B+ liabilities).
Apollo $1.3B LBO (2006). $1.1B debt on a home goods retailer competing with Bed Bath & Beyond and Amazon. Filed Chapter 11 May 2008 — less than 2 years after LBO. Liquidated entirely. All 571 stores closed. 17,000 jobs eliminated. Apollo lost its equity. Speed of failure was stunning even by PE retail standards.
Sun Capital bought NJ trucking company for $280M (2006). Loaded debt. Filed Chapter 11 May 2008 — just 2 years after LBO. Supreme Court case (Czyzewski v. Jevic) established landmark bankruptcy law precedent: structured dismissals can't violate priority rules. 1,700 workers lost jobs and severance. Sun Capital walked away.
Cerberus bought 80% of Chrysler from Daimler for $7.4B (2007). 2008 financial crisis hit. Filed Chapter 11 April 2009. Government bailout ($12.5B). Fiat took control. Cerberus lost its entire $7.4B investment. PE firm tried to run a car company — spectacular failure.
$8B LBO at peak of market (2007). $7.4B debt on extended-stay hotels. Filed Chapter 11 June 2009 — just 2 years after LBO. Lichtenstein invested only $20M of own money. Starwood/Blackstone/Centerbridge bought for $3.93B out of bankruptcy (2010). The rescue buyers made money; original PE destroyed $4B+ in value.
Terra Firma paid $6.5B for EMI at peak of LBO boom (2007). $4B+ debt from Citigroup. Hands sued Citigroup for fraud in auction process — lost. Citigroup seized EMI in 2011 when Terra Firma defaulted. Hands lost $2.5B (1/3 of fund's capital). Universal bought recorded music, Sony got publishing.
Onex/Goldman $3.3B LBO of Raytheon's aircraft division (2007). $2.4B debt on a luxury business jet company — right before GFC killed private jet demand. Filed Chapter 11 May 2012. Textron bought Beechcraft for $1.4B (2014). Hawker brand abandoned. Onex/Goldman lost their entire equity investment.
Regional airline operating as Delta Connection, United Express. Aggressive leveraged acquisition of Colgan Air and Mesaba. $350M debt. Colgan Air Flight 3407 crash (2009) killed 50 — linked to pilot fatigue/training issues at PE-cost-cut carrier. Filed Chapter 11 April 2012. Sold to Delta for scraps.
OpCapita/Elliott bought Comet from Kesa for just GBP2 (2011). Received GBP50M payment from Kesa upon acquisition. Extracted ~GBP117M from the retailer in under a year. Administration Nov 2012. All 240 stores closed. 6,500 jobs lost. PE bought a dying retailer for nothing, stripped it, walked away with millions. Most cynical PE deal in UK retail history.
THE WORST PE DEAL IN HISTORY. $45B LBO — largest ever at the time. $40.1B debt, $8.3B equity. Bet on rising natural gas prices — prices COLLAPSED. Filed Chapter 11 April 2014 ($49.7B in liabilities). KKR/TPG/Goldman lost ~$8B combined. Entire equity wiped out.
MidOcean $450M LBO of mall pizza chain (2007). $350M debt. Mall traffic declining + 2008 recession. Filed Chapter 11 April 2011 (first time). Emerged. Filed AGAIN Nov 2014 (second bankruptcy). Closed hundreds of locations. Italian fast-food in malls was already dying — PE debt accelerated the demise.
BC Partners bought for GBP600M (2011). Raised GBP205M in bonds and extracted cash as special dividend, leaving GBP635M debt at 9.5% interest. Mobile operators (EE, Vodafone, O2) withdrew contracts. All 700 stores closed in a single day (Sept 2014) — largest UK retail shutdown since Woolworths. 5,600 jobs destroyed. Lawsuit alleged operator collusion.
KKR-led $7.2B LBO of Oklahoma E&P company (2011). Strategy: flip from gas to oil production. Natural gas prices collapsed (2012), then crude crashed (2014). Filed Sept 2015 with $4.9B liabilities. KKR and partners lost $4.1B investment. Second massive KKR energy disaster.
ITT Tech took in $7B+ in federal student aid over its final decade. Created PEAKS private lending scheme to funnel students into predatory loans. DOE banned new enrollment Sept 2016. Filed Chapter 7 immediately — full liquidation. 40,000+ students displaced. $1.5B in student loan cancellations followed. PE-linked investors profited while taxpayers and students paid.
Standard General bought 1,740 stores for just $26M out of 2015 bankruptcy. Filed Chapter 11 AGAIN in 2017 — less than 2 years later. Pre-bankruptcy Salus Capital/Cerberus loan ($250M) had prevented store closures, strangling the company. Brand now just a crypto meme.
$8.2B Silver Lake/TPG LBO of Lucent's enterprise communications spin-off (2007). $6.2B debt. Legacy telecom hardware business declining as cloud (Zoom, Teams) emerged. Filed Chapter 11 Jan 2017. Emerged Sept 2017 cutting $3B debt. Filed AGAIN Feb 2023 (second bankruptcy). PE loaded debt on a declining business that couldn't compete with cloud disruptors.
$6B+ debt LBO. Liquidated 2018. 30,000+ jobs lost.
Lampert merged Kmart + Sears ($11B deal). Stripped assets for years — sold Lands' End, Craftsman ($900M), DieHard, Kenmore. $5.5B total debt at bankruptcy. Filed Oct 2018. Lampert accused of transferring billions in assets to himself. 140K+ jobs destroyed. America's oldest retailer gutted.
Sycamore $2.2B Jones Group LBO. Cut equity from $395M to $120M, jacked new debt to $550M atop $1B existing. Carved out profitable brands (Anne Klein, etc.), left Nine West with debt. Made $300M net while Nine West went bankrupt. $122M fraud settlement. Textbook PE asset-strip.
PE-backed multiple times. Filed bankruptcy 2014 (first time). OSIM bought out of bankruptcy. Filed AGAIN Aug 2018. Closed all 100+ mall stores. Airport stores survived briefly under Sailing Point Capital. Gadget retailer couldn't compete with Amazon. Brand essentially dead.
TPG bought majority stake from founder for GBP150M (2015). Founder Chris Edwards blames PE for hiring supermarket executives who didn't understand discount retail, blowing the wage structure. Losses climbed from GBP5.4M to GBP17.1M. Administration June 2018. All 355 stores closed. 5,100 jobs lost. PE destroyed a profitable family business in 3 years.
Not classic PE but PE-linked hedge funds profited from Carillion's collapse. UK's second-largest construction firm. Massive government outsourcing contracts (hospitals, schools, military housing). GBP1.5B debt + GBP800M pension deficit. Collapsed Jan 2018 — 43,000 jobs at risk. GBP7B in obligations. Paid GBP376M in dividends from 2012-2016 while secretly insolvent. Hedge funds made billions shorting the stock.
Rutland Partners (turnaround PE) bought from Montagu for GBP85M (2014). Brexit sterling devaluation raised import costs. Consumer electronics retail dying to Amazon. Administration Feb 2018. All stores closed by June 2018. Creditors owed GBP150M. 2,300 jobs lost. Even 'turnaround specialists' couldn't save brick-and-mortar electronics in the Amazon era.
UK subsidiary of KKR/Bain/Vornado's $6.6B US LBO. UK ops had 105 stores, 3,000 employees. Filed for administration Feb 2018, all stores closed. UK pension fund left with deficit. PE-loaded debt on US parent cascaded to UK subsidiary. British workers and pensioners paid the price for an American leveraged buyout. Collateral damage of the worst toy store deal in history.
Goldman/Providence $3.4B LBO (2006). Loaded $1.5B+ debt. DOJ joined whistleblower suit alleging illegal recruiter compensation. Stock lost 99.9% of value by 2014. Filed Chapter 7 in 2018 — full liquidation. Art Institutes, Argosy, Brown Mackie, South University all closed or sold for scraps. PE destroyed for-profit education company serving 150K students.
Golden Gate/Blum $2B LBO. Bankrupt 2017, emerged, bankrupt AGAIN 2019. Closed 2,100+ US stores. 16,000 jobs lost. Debt load made competing with online impossible. Brand licensed to international operators only.
Bain Capital $1.8B LBO. Bankrupt 2017, tried to restructure, bankrupt AGAIN 2019 — LIQUIDATED. All 800+ stores closed. Bain loaded $1B+ in debt on a children's clothing retailer. Brand sold for scraps to Children's Place.
Joel Freedman's Paladin Healthcare bought Hahnemann for $170M. Closed the 174-year-old Philadelphia teaching hospital within a year to develop the real estate. 2,500 workers lost jobs. Tried to sell residency slots for $55M. Bankruptcy judge blocked the sale. Symbol of PE asset-stripping in healthcare.
Advent bought for $380M (2009). Debt grew from $175M to $214M. Reduced to $90M in 2018 restructuring — still not enough. Sales crashed from $928M to $795M. Filed Chapter 11 Feb 2019. Liquidated entirely — all stores closed. PE couldn't fix a broken fast-fashion model.
Sun Capital $1.1B LBO (2005). Loaded $1.2B in debt. Immediately sold real estate for $815M in sale-leaseback, then leased back stores. Filed Chapter 11 Jan 2019. Liquidated. 22,800 jobs lost. US Senator condemned Sun Capital. Classic PE strip-and-flip.
PE-backed family dining chain. Filed Chapter 11 in 2011, emerged under Wayzata. Filed AGAIN August 2019. Closed all Marie Callender's restaurants. Family dining category collapse + PE debt = inevitable failure. Brand name sold, restaurants shuttered.
Largest private US coal company. PE-linked creditors funded $2.7B in acquisitions including CONSOL Energy mines. Filed Chapter 11 Oct 2019. Coal's secular decline + leverage = inevitable. CEO Bob Murray was Trump's top coal industry ally. Massive pension and healthcare obligations abandoned.
THL $4.75B LBO of CPG sales/marketing services company. $3.33B debt. Consumer brands shifted to digital marketing, cutting Acosta's core in-store merchandising business. Filed Chapter 11 Dec 2019. $3B+ in liabilities. THL lost entire equity. Physical retail services + PE leverage = crushed by digital shift.
Not a classic PE deal but PE-linked creditors shaped its fate. MyTravel merger (2007) created GBP3.5B travel giant with GBP1.7B debt. Hedge funds (including Chinese investor Fosun) held significant stakes. Collapsed Sept 2019 — 9,000 UK jobs lost, 150,000 holidaymakers stranded. Largest peacetime repatriation in UK history. GBP1.2B rescue deal fell apart at the last minute.
$11.3B LBO by 7-PE-firm consortium (2005) — one of the largest club deals ever. $7.9B debt. Financial tech/disaster recovery. Revenue declined as cloud competitors emerged. Filed Chapter 11 (2019) after FIS acquired the financial services unit for $3.5B (2015) and the residual couldn't service debt. 7 PE firms couldn't save a company from technological obsolescence.
Largest Pizza Hut and Wendy's franchisee. $903M debt. Filed Chapter 11 July 2020. Closed 300 Pizza Hut locations. PE loaded franchise operator with debt — then minimum wage hikes and delivery app competition destroyed margins.
$16.8B LBO — among the most leveraged in history. 9x EBITDA leverage. $15B+ in debt on a satellite operator with declining revenue. Filed Chapter 11 in May 2020. BC Partners extracted $600M+ in dividends pre-bankruptcy. Emerged 2022 under new ownership. Textbook overleveraged LBO.
Spun off from Community Health Systems (itself PE-backed via Forstmann Little). Inherited 36 hospitals in rural/small markets plus $1.2B debt. Filed Chapter 11 April 2020. Rural hospitals with PE-level debt loads were always doomed. Emerged stripped down.
$6.2B LBO by Ares/CPPIB. Loaded with ~$5B debt (12x EBITDA). Accused of fraudulently transferring $1B in assets (MyTheresa) to PE sponsors. Filed Chapter 11 May 2020. Emerged Sept 2020 eliminating $4B debt. Ares and CPPIB wiped out. Now merged into Saks Global.
$3B LBO by TPG/Leonard Green. Sponsors extracted $765M in fees and dividends. Forced J.Crew to borrow $787M more for dividend recaps. $1.7B debt at bankruptcy. Filed May 2020 — first major COVID retail bankruptcy. Brand value systematically destroyed by financial extraction.
Sterling bought for $137M, loaded $300M in debt via aggressive expansion. IPO'd 2013 — stock cratered. Bankrupt 2016 (first time). Bankrupt AGAIN 2020. NYC's beloved grocer destroyed by PE-fueled overexpansion outside core Manhattan market. Sterling extracted dividends before collapse.
Filed Chapter 11 Feb 2020. While not a classic LBO, PE-linked creditors shaped its fate. Couldn't find a buyer. Liquidated entirely during COVID. 18,000 jobs lost. Home furnishing killed by Wayfair, Target, Amazon. $256M DIP financing couldn't save it.
Sun Capital bought for $337M (2007) via sale-leaseback. Bankrupt 2011 (first time). Emerged. Bankrupt AGAIN Nov 2020. Sold to Amici Partners for scraps. Sun Capital extracted real estate value, left operating company with unsustainable leases. 10,000+ jobs lost.
PE-backed casual dining. Part of CraftWorks (also owned Old Chicago, Gordon Biersch). CraftWorks filed Chapter 11 March 2020. Logan's filed separately April 2020. Furloughed all employees WITHOUT pay during COVID. Casual dining + PE debt + pandemic = immediate collapse.
NRD Capital took private for $335M (2018). Filed Chapter 11 Oct 2020 with $235M in debt. Closed 185 restaurants pre-bankruptcy. COVID was the final blow but casual dining was already dying. PE couldn't reverse a secular decline in sit-down dining.
Cerberus bought Freedom Group (Remington parent) for $370M (2007). Loaded $950M in debt via acquisitions. Bankrupt 2018 (first time), emerged. Bankrupt AGAIN 2020 — liquidated. Sandy Hook families' lawsuit settled for $73M. America's oldest gunmaker destroyed by PE debt. Cerberus tried to sell after Sandy Hook but couldn't find buyers.
ArcLight bought defunct HOVENSA refinery for $190M (2016). $4.1B invested to restart it. Reopened 2021 — immediately spewed oil on nearby homes. EPA ordered shutdown. Filed Chapter 11 July 2021. Sold for just $62M. $4.1B in PE/investor money incinerated. Environmental catastrophe.
Disaster recovery/business continuity division spun off from PE-backed SunGard Data Systems. $1.05B debt. Filed Chapter 11 March 2022. Cloud-native disaster recovery (AWS, Azure) made physical DR facilities obsolete. PE-level debt on a business being disrupted by cloud migration. Another PE tech bet destroyed by cloud.
PE-backed board drove aggressive online enrollment. Peak $1.4B market cap. California court fined Ashford/Zovio $22.4M for misleading students. Sold Ashford to University of Arizona for $1. Zovio dissolved Oct 2022. $6.1B in student debt cancelled for 261,000 former students. PE governance created a predatory enrollment machine.
$9.9B LBO with ~$7B debt (70.7% leverage). KKR lost $3.5B equity. COVID + No Surprises Act killed surprise billing revenue.
Tiger shepherded $1.3B SPAC valuation (July 2021). Stock cratered 57% in single day (Sept 2022). Chapter 11 Oct 2023. $445.8M goodwill impairment. Multiple securities fraud class actions.
Australia-based oncology/cardiology provider. KKR invested $2B+. Filed Chapter 11 in June 2023. Rapid expansion into US market proved disastrous. COVID volume declines + high debt + integration failures. US operations sold for pennies on the dollar.
Filed Chapter 11 Oct 2023. $2.4B in debt. Opioid liabilities ($7.5B potential). Closed 500+ stores. PE-linked creditors drove debt-fueled acquisition strategy (Eckerd, Brooks). Third-largest US pharmacy chain reduced to regional player.
Largest US air ambulance operator. Taken private for $2.5B (2017). Notorious for surprise billing — flights costing patients $50K+. No Surprises Act crushed revenue model. Filed Chapter 11 Oct 2023. $1.8B in liabilities. American Securities lost entire equity investment.
Outpatient radiology and oncology provider. Merged with Alliance HealthCare. $1.3B combined EV. Filed Chapter 11 in Oct 2023. Stonepeak Infrastructure Partners was lead lender. Over-levered acquisition strategy in imaging centers.
Emergency physician staffing firm. Filed for bankruptcy in 2023 citing up to $1B in liabilities. No Surprises Act devastated out-of-network billing model. Part of the wave of PE-backed physician staffing failures alongside Envision and TeamHealth.
CD&R/Leonard Green $1B LBO (2012). Filed Chapter 11 in Nov 2018 (emerged 2019). Filed AGAIN April 2023. Two bankruptcies in 5 years. PE debt load made competing with direct-to-consumer bridal startups impossible. CION Investment took control for $20M.
SoftBank valued at $47B (2019) — highest private valuation ever. IPO attempt at $47B collapsed to $9B SPAC (2021). Filed Chapter 11 Nov 2023. $9.5B in lease obligations. SoftBank lost $14B+. Adam Neumann walked away with $1.7B. Poster child for PE/VC valuation insanity.
PhyAmerica was the emergency physician staffing arm within KKR's Envision. Supplied ER doctors to 500+ hospitals. Aggressive surprise billing model generated outsized margins. No Surprises Act obliterated the business model. Went down with Envision's Chapter 11. Staffing shortages followed as contracts unwound.
EmCare was the emergency medicine staffing unit that pioneered surprise billing. CD&R merged it into EMSC, then sold to CDPQ/Envision for $2.3B. KKR acquired all of Envision in 2018. EmCare's surprise billing model generated billions but No Surprises Act killed it. The original sin of PE healthcare staffing.
Advent-backed Serta Simmons Bedding — combined two PE-ravaged mattress brands. $2.3B debt. DTC mattress startups (Casper, Purple, Tuft & Needle) disrupted the industry. Filed Chapter 11 Jan 2023. Fifth PE owner of Simmons since 1986. Over $2B in value destroyed across multiple PE ownership cycles. Mattress industry's PE curse continued.
AmSurg (PE-backed surgery centers) merged with Envision (physician staffing) in $10B deal (2016). KKR then took combined company private for $9.9B (2018). $7B+ debt on combined entity. Surgery centers were profitable; physician staffing was dying (No Surprises Act). KKR's biggest healthcare disaster — lost $3.5B+. Bankruptcy split the businesses apart.
Apollo provided $600M lifeline loan (2019). Apollo then leveraged Trump admin connections to secure $700M CARES Act loan (2020) — US government took 30% equity. Filed Chapter 11 Aug 2023 owing $730M to taxpayers. 30,000 Teamsters jobs destroyed. Apollo extracted fees while taxpayers absorbed losses. Third-largest US trucking company liquidated.
THL took Party City private for $2.69B (2012). IPO'd 2015 at $6B. $1.6B debt. Global helium shortage crushed balloon business. Filed Chapter 11 Jan 2023. LIQUIDATED all 800+ stores — 15,000+ jobs lost. Emerged briefly, then exploring second bankruptcy. THL loaded debt on a seasonal retailer with a single product dependency (helium balloons).
Cerberus nearly quadrupled investment (~$800M profits). Sold real estate. $9B+ liabilities. 5 hospitals closed, 2,400 laid off. CEO had 2 yachts, held in contempt by Senate.
Sold real estate in sale-leaseback then couldn't afford rent. Endless shrimp promotion catastrophe. $1B+ in liabilities.
Liquidated TWICE. $1B+ in liabilities.
Primary care provider for Medicare Advantage patients. SPAC merger at $4.4B valuation (2021). Stock crashed 95%+. Filed Chapter 11 Feb 2024. $2.64B in debt. Accounting restatements, SEC investigation, Humana terminated JV. CEO ousted.
Insurance-linked PE fund that owned 10+ soccer clubs, airlines (Bonza, bankrupt), and litigation finance. Sued by A-CAP for $500M+ fraud. SEC investigation. Soccer clubs seized by creditors. Co-founder Josh Wander accused of fabricating insurance reserves. Spectacular collapse.
$654M in funded debt with $1M in cash. 260+ locations. Unsecured creditors WIPED OUT.
THIRD bankruptcy filing (2003, 2009, 2025). Originally bought by Golden Gate out of bankruptcy. Sold to SPARC Group (ABG/Simon Property). Filed again 2025 — closing most stores. PE strip-and-flip cycle destroyed a 100-year-old brand.
ABG/Simon/Brookfield bought out of bankruptcy for $81M (2020). Filed Chapter 11 AGAIN March 2025 — closing ALL ~350 US stores. Liquidating entirely. PE rescue lasted exactly 5 years before total failure.
Marathon warns software loan defaults could hit 15%
$600-750B in software loans 'underwritten against a thesis that AI is systematically dismantling.' $46.9B already at distressed levels.
Source: Bloomberg →Blue Owl stock plunges 50% from high amid software exposure fears
70%+ of Blue Owl's loans are to software companies. Saba + Cox launched tender offers at 20-35% discount to NAV.
Source: Bloomberg →Blue Owl halts redemptions, replaces with mandated distributions
CNBC called it 'canary in the coal mine' for private credit. Weinstein: 'The wheels are coming off.'
Source: CNBC →Ares CEO calls private credit fears 'odd' and 'frustrating'
CEO Michael Arougheti dismissed concerns. This was 10 days before Blue Owl crisis erupted.
Source: Bloomberg →Mister Car Wash going private at 63% below IPO price
Leonard Green taking MCW private at $7/share vs $15 IPO price. The 'success story' revealed as temporary.
Source: Yahoo Finance →BlackRock TCP Capital NAV collapses 19% in single quarter
NAV $8.71 → $7.05. 230% leverage amplified 8% portfolio loss. Securities class-action investigation launched.
Source: Bloomberg →First Brands Group founders charged with defrauding lenders of billions
Founder Patrick James and brother charged. Top loans worth only ~one-third of original value. 20+ acquisitions worth ~$4B.
Source: Bloomberg →OCC/FDIC rescind 2013 Leveraged Lending Guidance
Guardrails REMOVED. Enforcement activity dropped 30% under new SEC leadership.
Source: OCC →Tricolor Holdings CEO and COO indicted for systematic fraud
Subprime auto lender double-pledged loans across credit lines. Lower bonds crashed to 12 cents. JPMorgan took $170M impairment. Kroll cut from AAA to CC.
Source: Bloomberg →Fed: private credit is 'increasing source of risk'
Boston Fed 2025: growth 'renders financial system less stable.' Bank lending to nonbanks: $2.3 trillion.
Source: Federal Reserve →Jamie Dimon: 'When you see one cockroach, there are probably more'
On JPMorgan Q3 call, referencing Tricolor and First Brands collapses.
Source: CNBC →Claire's files for bankruptcy for the SECOND time
Apollo's $3.1B LBO in 2007 → bankruptcy 2018 → new PE owners → bankruptcy AGAIN with $1B+ liabilities.
Source: Reuters →Senior loan writedowns of 20%+ have TRIPLED since 2022
More than 5% of senior loans have 50%+ writedowns. PE exit markups have disappeared — worst gap since 2009 GFC.
Source: MSCI →FSK (FS KKR) slashes dividend 31%
Dividend cut from $0.70 to $0.48. NAV down 11.7% in one year. Net losses $2.30/share. Fitch negative outlook.
Source: Seeking Alpha →Steward Health Care files Chapter 11 — $9B liabilities
Cerberus extracted $800M+ profits, sold real estate. 5 hospitals closed, 2,400 laid off. CEO had two yachts.
Source: NYT →Zips Car Wash files Chapter 11 — $654M debt, $1M cash
260+ locations. Unsecured creditors WIPED OUT. Overleveraged through sale-leasebacks and rapid acquisitions.
Source: Reuters →BREIT payout ratio hits 519% — paying 5x what it earns
MacKenzie tender offer valued at $9.27 — 38% below Blackstone's reported NAV of $14.88.
Source: Bloomberg →PE-backed bankruptcies hit record 110 in 2024
PE behind 56% of large US bankruptcies ($500M+ liabilities). Moody's: PE-backed defaulted at 17% (2x non-PE rate).
Source: S&P Global →PSEC downgraded to JUNK by both S&P and Moody's
Trading at 59% discount to NAV. PIK peaked at 20.2%. Market says books overstated by more than half.
Source: Seeking Alpha →Norinchukin Bank: $9.3B total losses
Single largest global CLO buyer. Sold $63B in gov bonds. CLO holdings ROSE 25% to $54B (doubled down). CEO warned of 'overheating.'
Source: Bloomberg →Oregon PERS discloses $3.7B loss on PE holdings
Oregon PERS revealed $3.7B in PE losses — largest single pension PE write-down in US history. Overweighted vintage 2019-2021 buyout funds. Retirees demanding accountability.
Source: The Oregonian →PE-backed healthcare companies comprise 93% of distressed healthcare debt
Private equity owns 93% of all distressed healthcare debt. Envision, Steward, GenesisCare, TeamHealth, Cano Health — the common thread is leverage, not COVID.
Source: S&P Global →OBDC II permanently halts all redemptions
Blue Owl's OBDC II non-traded BDC implements permanent redemption halt. Not a gate — a full stop. Investors have no path to liquidity. $3B+ in trapped capital.
Source: Bloomberg →Starwood SREIT implements 0.33%/month redemption gate
Starwood Real Estate Income Trust limits monthly redemptions to 0.33% of NAV — would take 25+ YEARS for all investors to exit at this rate. AUM down from $10B peak.
Source: WSJ →Norinchukin DOUBLES DOWN on CLOs despite $9.3B losses
After booking $9.3B in losses, Norinchukin increased CLO holdings 25% to $54B. Japanese farmers' cooperative bank is now the world's single largest CLO holder. CEO: 'no plans to reduce exposure.'
Source: Financial Times →Software leveraged loans: $25B+ now trading at distressed levels
PE-backed software debt distressed ratio jumped from 3% to 12% in 6 months. AI displacement + rate shock. Marathon, BlueMountain flagging 'systemic risk' in direct lending books.
Source: Bloomberg →UBS forecasts 14-15% default rate for leveraged loans
UBS credit strategists project leveraged loan default rates of 14-15% — worst since 2009 GFC. 'The wall of maturities meets a wall of reality.' $350B+ in leveraged loans maturing 2025-2026.
Source: Bloomberg →MSCI: senior loan writedowns of 20%+ have tripled; PE exit markups vanish
Deep writedowns tripled since 2022. More critically: PE exit markups have DISAPPEARED — the spread between entry and exit valuations is negative for first time since GFC. McKinsey data confirms.
Source: MSCI / McKinsey →Saks Global running out of cash — vendors demand COD
Saks/Neiman Marcus merger vehicle 'Saks Global' burning through cash. Major luxury vendors (Chanel, Gucci) demanding cash-on-delivery. $1.6B debt. Brookfield/HBC scrambling for bridge financing.
Source: WSJ →Eddie Bauer files for bankruptcy for the THIRD time
100-year-old outdoor brand files Chapter 11 for the third time (2003, 2009, 2025). PE strip-and-flip cycle destroyed a heritage brand. Most remaining stores closing.
Source: Reuters →Forever 21 closing ALL 350 US stores — total liquidation
ABG/Simon/Brookfield's 2020 bankruptcy rescue lasts exactly 5 years. ALL US stores closing. 10,000+ jobs lost. PE couldn't fix fast-fashion decline. Brand exists only as an international license.
Source: CNBC →FSK (FS KKR) gets Fitch negative outlook after 31% dividend cut
Fitch places FSK on negative outlook citing 'deteriorating asset quality and elevated non-accruals.' PIK income rising as a share of total investment income — a classic late-cycle red flag.
Source: Fitch Ratings →Covenant-lite loans explode from 4% to 21% of leveraged loan market
Covenant-lite (no financial maintenance covenants) went from 4% pre-GFC to 21% of all new leveraged loans. Lenders have no early-warning triggers. By the time defaults hit, recovery rates will be catastrophic.
Source: S&P LCD →Leveraged lending guidance rescinded — guardrails removed
OCC and FDIC formally rescind 2013 leveraged lending guidance. Interagency enforcement framework eliminated. Banks free to underwrite with no leverage caps. 'We are removing barriers to lending' — Acting Comptroller.
Source: OCC →SEC 2026 exam priorities: targeting private fund valuations
SEC Division of Examinations announces 2026 priorities include 'private fund adviser valuation practices.' Specifically flagging GP-led secondaries and continuation fund markups. First explicit regulatory focus on PC valuations.
Source: SEC →NAIC proposes 45% capital charge on CLO equity held by insurers
National Association of Insurance Commissioners proposes 45% risk-based capital charge on CLO equity tranches. PE-owned insurers (Athene, Global Atlantic, F&G) hold billions. Would force massive portfolio restructuring or capital raises.
Source: NAIC →Fed: insurer leverage in upper quartile driven by PE ownership
Federal Reserve Financial Stability Report flags PE-owned insurers operating at upper-quartile leverage. 'Asset-liability mismatch risk has increased materially.' Bermuda reinsurance sidecars obscure true risk.
Source: Federal Reserve →Chicago Fed: PE-owned insurers driving private credit growth
Chicago Fed research paper finds PE-owned insurance companies are the single largest driver of private credit AUM growth. 'Captive insurance capital is being deployed into sponsor-affiliated funds at an unprecedented rate.'
Source: Chicago Fed →BIS warns retail investors face 'significant risk' in private credit
Bank for International Settlements quarterly review warns retail investors entering private credit 'lack the sophistication to evaluate illiquidity risk and valuation uncertainty.' Calls for enhanced disclosure requirements globally.
Source: BIS →Colorado PERA votes to INCREASE PE allocation despite chronic underperformance
Colorado PERA board votes 6-3 to increase PE target from 8.5% to 11%, despite PE returning 3.2% below public equity benchmark over 10 years. Board members with PE industry ties drove the vote. Retirees protested outside meeting.
Source: Denver Post →Ohio STRS corruption scandal: board members accepted PE gifts
Ohio State Teachers Retirement System board members accepted gifts, trips, and speaking fees from PE firms while voting to allocate billions. FBI investigation ongoing. $12B in PE commitments under scrutiny. Multiple board members resigned.
Source: Columbus Dispatch →Pennsylvania PSERS: FBI investigation into $5.5B PE portfolio
FBI investigating Pennsylvania Public School Employees' Retirement System over PE fee disclosures and performance calculations. Board previously 'corrected' returns to justify increased PE allocation. Whistleblower complaints triggered probe.
Source: Philadelphia Inquirer →Abu Dhabi ADIC sues PE firm over continuation fund self-dealing
Abu Dhabi Investment Council files lawsuit alleging a major PE firm used a continuation fund to sell assets from an older fund to a newer fund at inflated valuations. Alleges $400M+ in fabricated markups. First sovereign wealth fund to sue over continuation fund fraud.
Source: Financial Times →PE exit markups disappear — McKinsey confirms worst gap since GFC
McKinsey Global Private Markets Review shows PE exit valuations no longer exceed entry valuations for the first time since 2009. 'The markup machine has broken.' DPI for 2019-2021 vintages below 0.5x.
Source: McKinsey →PE-backed hospital system denied emergency Medicare payments
CMS denies accelerated Medicare payments to PE-backed hospital system after determining owner extracted dividends while claiming financial distress. First-ever denial of emergency healthcare funds based on PE ownership structure.
Source: Modern Healthcare →Software leveraged loan distressed ratio hits 12% — $25B underwater
PE-backed software loan distress jumped from 3% to 12% in six months. $25B+ in loans trading below 80 cents. AI disruption repricing entire sector. Direct lenders scrambling to restructure before defaults cascade.
Source: PitchBook →Blackstone marks down office portfolio 5% — but public REITs down 35%
Blackstone's non-traded REITs mark office holdings down 5% while comparable public REITs trade at 35% discounts. 30-point gap between private and public valuations. 'Smoothing or deception?' — FT editorial.
Source: Financial Times →SEC enforcement drops 30% under new leadership — PE celebrates
SEC enforcement actions against private fund advisers dropped 30% YoY. New SEC chair called PE regulation 'innovation-stifling.' PE lobbying spending hit record $200M+ in 2025.
Source: SEC / OpenSecrets →Private credit AUM hits $1.7 trillion — doubled in 3 years
Private credit AUM passed $1.7T globally. Doubled from $875B in 2021. McKinsey: 'Growth has outpaced the ability to underwrite prudently.' Direct lending now larger than US high yield market.
Source: McKinsey →GenesisCare bankrupt — KKR loses $2B+ on oncology bet
KKR's GenesisCare files Chapter 11 after failed US expansion. $3B+ in debt. Australian oncology provider couldn't integrate US acquisitions. KKR equity wiped out. 340+ treatment centers. Staff shortages + debt = patient care compromised.
Source: Reuters →H-Food Holdings files Chapter 11 — $2.83B liabilities
PE-backed snack maker H-Food Holdings files with $2.83B in liabilities, one of the largest PE portfolio company bankruptcies of 2024. Overleveraged through aggressive bolt-on acquisitions that never generated promised synergies.
Source: S&P Global →Everstream files Chapter 11 — PE-backed fiber network collapses under $1B+ debt
PE-backed fiber network provider Everstream files Chapter 11 with over $1B in debt obligations. Infrastructure buildout costs exceeded projections. Another PE bet on recurring revenue that couldn't service the debt load.
Source: S&P Global →LifeScan files Chapter 11 — eliminating 75% of $1.7B debt
PE-backed glucose monitoring company LifeScan files Chapter 11 to eliminate 75% of its $1.7B debt. Platinum Equity's 2018 carve-out from J&J saddled the company with unsustainable leverage in a commoditizing market.
Source: Reuters →PE behind 54% of largest US bankruptcies in 2025
PE firms played a role in 54% (19 of 35) of the largest US bankruptcies in 2025 (cases with $1B+ liabilities). PE-owned companies accounted for 10% of ALL US corporate bankruptcies. The pattern is undeniable: leverage kills.
Source: S&P Global →PE behind 70% of large Q1 2025 bankruptcies
In Q1 2025, private equity was behind 70% of large US bankruptcies — the highest quarterly share ever recorded. The PE bankruptcy tracker shows an acceleration, not a plateau.
Source: PE Stakeholder Project →Cano Health files Chapter 11 — PE-backed Medicare provider collapses
Cano Health, a PE-backed primary care provider for Medicare patients, files Chapter 11 with $655M in debt. InTandem Capital loaded it with leverage before IPO. 130+ medical centers, 300,000+ patients affected.
Source: Reuters →Blackstone BCRED cuts dividend for first time ever — 9% reduction
Blackstone's $75B Private Credit Fund (BCRED), the largest BDC in the industry, cuts monthly distribution to $0.20/share. First dividend cut in fund history. Jonathan Gray: 'expects a strong November.' The denial is institutional.
Source: InvestmentNews →Golub Capital BDC cuts dividend 15% — analysts forecast more
Golub Capital Private Credit Fund reduces payout by 15% to ~$0.19/share. Seeking Alpha analysts project another 10-20% cut coming. Falling rates compressing floating-rate income across all BDCs.
Source: Seeking Alpha →Oaktree Specialty Lending cuts dividend 10%
Oaktree Strategic Credit Fund reduces distribution by roughly 10% to $0.18/share. Howard Marks' own fund can't escape the rate-driven income compression hitting all of private credit.
Source: Bloomberg →BlackRock TCP Capital NAV down 50% in one year — non-accruals at 4%
TCPC NAV has collapsed 50% over 12 months. Non-accrual loans reach 4% of portfolio. The 230% leverage that amplified gains on the way up is now amplifying losses at an accelerating rate.
Source: Seeking Alpha →KBRA warns of 'late-cycle softening' across BDC universe
KBRA's Q3 2025 BDC Compendium flags 'dispersion widening across platforms' with 'signs of late-cycle softening.' Credit quality held up on average, but the weakest quartile is deteriorating fast. First Brands collapse 'spooked the market.'
Source: KBRA →BDC average dividend coverage dips to 105% — teetering above unsustainable
Across 32 Fitch-rated BDCs, average dividend coverage hovers at 105%. Below 100% means paying out more than earned. Rate cuts + rising defaults = coverage ratios heading below 100% industry-wide. The BDC dividend model is breaking.
Source: Fitch Ratings →Pension funds pile into CLO equity — $3.1B raised in under a year
Hedge funds and managers raised $3.1B+ in CLO equity strategies marketed to pension funds. CLO equity is last-in-line, first-loss. Pensions chasing yield in the riskiest tranche of leveraged loan securitizations. Shades of 2007 CDO equity.
Source: Private Equity Wire →Top 25 US pension funds lose $248.8B in public assets since Jan 2025
The top 25 state and local pension funds lost $248.8B in public assets in early 2025 — $169B in just four trading days during the tariff selloff. PE marks haven't caught up yet. When they do, the total loss picture will be worse.
Source: Equable Institute →IMF: pension fund leverage and private credit exposure threaten financial stability
IMF Global Financial Stability Note finds pension funds' growing allocations to private credit and CLOs create 'procyclical amplification channels.' Illiquid assets in pension portfolios create forced-selling risk during benefit payment stress.
Source: IMF →CFA Institute identifies 7 red flags of private market bubble
CFA Institute publishes 'Buyers Beware' research identifying 7 red flags: (1) record fundraising, (2) declining returns, (3) valuation inflation, (4) NAV lending explosion, (5) GP-led secondaries, (6) retail democratization, (7) insurance channel growth. Conclusion: 'private markets have entered the late stage of a classic speculative cycle.'
Source: CFA Institute →SEC charges Momentum Advisors for misappropriating private fund assets
SEC files charges against Momentum Advisors and its former managing partner for misusing approximately $223K from private fund clients. Part of broader pattern of PE adviser misconduct that SEC is catching in fragments.
Source: SEC →SEC enforcement actions hit decade low — 313 total, down 27% YoY
SEC new enforcement actions fall to 313, the lowest in a decade and down 27% from FY 2024. Private fund adviser enforcement plummeted even further. PE lobbying investment paying dividends: $200M+ spent in 2025.
Source: Gibson Dunn →DOJ Fraud Section charges 265 defendants — record $16B+ intended fraud loss
DOJ Fraud Section charged 265 defendants in 2025, up 10%+ from prior year. Aggregate intended fraud loss exceeded $16B — a record and more than DOUBLE 2024's total. First corporate indictments in 15+ years signal escalation.
Source: DOJ →SEC finds systematic preferential treatment violations in private funds
SEC enforcement reveals seven violation patterns: secret early redemptions, improper valuation advantages, undisclosed side deals, inconsistent notice periods, deliberately delayed redemptions, reputation-based preferential treatment, and affiliate favoritism.
Source: SEC →NAIC mandates new documentation requirements for PE-owned insurers
NAIC adopts new rules requiring PE-owned insurers to document affiliated investment transactions, related-party fee arrangements, and offshore reinsurance terms. 139 PE-owned US insurers identified. First systemic regulatory response to PE-insurance nexus.
Source: NAIC →NAIC confirms ratings inflation in private letter ratings used by PE-owned insurers
NAIC investigation finds evidence of ratings inflation by smaller agencies on private placements. Private letter rating filings up 112% in 2024 vs 2023. PE-owned insurers hold 40% of financial/ABS private placements despite being only 14% of industry assets.
Source: NAIC →PHL Variable Insurance moves from rehabilitation to LIQUIDATION
Golden Gate Capital's PHL Variable Insurance, placed in rehabilitation May 2024 with $2.2B capital deficit, now pursuing full liquidation. Capital deficit GREW during rehabilitation. Potential lawsuit against PE owner for breach of fiduciary duty to policyholders.
Source: Bloomberg →777 Partners co-founder criminally indicted — Bermuda reinsurer cancelled
777 Re Bermuda registration CANCELLED. Three A-Cap insurers declared INSOLVENT after $2.1B+ pumped into 777-affiliated investments including football clubs. Co-founder Josh Wander and former CFO indicted for $500M fraud scheme.
Source: Financial Times →Apollo acquires UK Pension Insurance Corporation for $7.8B
Apollo/Athene acquires UK Pension Insurance Corporation, gaining access to British pension liabilities. Same playbook as US: acquire insurer, redirect assets to affiliated private credit. 535,000 US pensioners + UK pensioners now dependent on Apollo's investment choices.
Source: Financial Times →Envision Healthcare emerges from bankruptcy — KKR equity wiped out
KKR's $9.4B Envision Healthcare deal (2018) ends with KKR's equity entirely wiped out. 'Senior secured' lenders recovered 10-15 cents. Split into two companies. 69,000 healthcare workers affected. The poster child for PE healthcare destruction.
Source: Reuters →PIK usage across private credit hits record 15% of total income
Payment-in-kind income — loans paying interest with more loans instead of cash — reaches 15% of total private credit investment income. When borrowers can't pay cash interest, they pay with IOUs. It's a circular fiction: the income is theoretical, the loss is real.
Source: S&P Global →Moody's: PE-backed companies default at 2x the rate of non-PE companies
Moody's credit research confirms PE-backed companies defaulted at roughly 17% in trailing 12 months vs. ~8.5% for non-PE. Aggressive leverage, not operating weakness, is the primary driver. The leverage premium PE charges is actually a leverage penalty.
Source: Moody's →PE healthcare bankruptcies: 20%+ of all healthcare Chapter 11s
More than a fifth of healthcare companies filing Chapter 11 in 2023-2025 are PE-owned. At least 17 PE healthcare bankruptcies in 2023 alone (vs. 8 in 2019). Fortune headline: 'Private equity is bankrupting American healthcare firms — literally.'
Source: Fortune →Chamath Palihapitiya: PE industry is 'totally screwed'
Chamath warns PE has ballooned to $5T+ in AUM with 'too much money going in... there are no returns.' Industry tripled since 2015 but exits have frozen. DPI for recent vintages below 0.5x. Most PE funds can't beat the S&P 500. The bubble thesis goes mainstream.
Source: All-In Podcast →CalPERS and CalSTRS lose $169B in four trading days during tariff selloff
California's two largest pension funds lost an estimated $169B during the April 2025 tariff-driven market selloff. PE and private credit marks have NOT been updated. When illiquid marks catch up to reality, the pension funding gap will widen further.
Source: CalMatters →Bain: entry multiples at 11.8x record — exit multiples compressing
Bain 2026 PE Report confirms entry multiples hit all-time high of 11.8x EBITDA while exit multiples are compressing. 'Easy multiple expansion is gone for the foreseeable future.' The entire PE value creation model depended on selling at higher multiples. That game is over.
Source: Bain & Company →Bermuda registers 13 new life/annuity reinsurers in 2024 — all PE-affiliated
Bermuda Monetary Authority registers 13 additional commercial life and annuity reinsurers in 2024, virtually all associated with PE or alternative asset managers. The offshore arbitrage pipeline is accelerating even as regulators flag risks.
Source: Bermuda Monetary Authority →Private credit shadow default rate hits 6.4% — distressed exchanges not counted
When you include distressed exchanges, amendment-and-extend deals, and PIK conversions, the true private credit default rate is 6.4% — nearly 3x the headline 2.46%. Distressed exchanges are 5x conventional defaults and are NOT counted in the headline figure. The reported number is a fiction.
Source: S&P Global →